Modal logics of strategic ability usually focus on capturing what it means for an agent to have a feasible strategy that brings about some property. While there is a general agreement on abilities in scenarios where agents have perfect information, the right semantics for ability under incomplete information is still debated upon. Epistemic Temporal Strategic Logic, an offspring of this debate, can be treated as a logic that captures properties of agents' rational play. In this paper, we provide a semantics of ETSL that is more compact and comprehensible than the one presented in the original paper by van Otterloo and Jonker. Second, we use ETSL to show that a rational player knows that he will succeed if, and only if, he knows how to play to succeed -while the same is not true for rational coalitions of players.
Introduction
Modal logics of strategic ability usually focus on capturing what it means for an agent to have a feasible strategy that brings about some property. While there is a general agreement on abilities in scenarios where agents have perfect information, the right semantics for ability under incomplete information is still debated upon. Epistemic Temporal Strategic Logic, proposed by van Otterloo and Jonker [19] , is an offspring of this debate, but one that leads in an orthogonal direction to the mainstream solutions.
of ATL formulae is:
Example ATL properties are: jamesbond ♦win (James Bond has an infallible plan to eventually win) and jamesbond, bondsgirl fun U shot-at (Bond and his girlfriend have a collective way of having fun until someone shoots at them).
A number of semantics have been defined for ATL, most of them equivalent [4] . In this paper, we use a variant of concurrent game structures, M = Agt, St, Π, π, Act, d, o , which includes a nonempty finite set of all agents Agt = {1, ..., k}, a nonempty set of states St, a set of atomic propositions Π, a valuation of propositions π : Π → P(St), and a nonempty set of (atomic) actions Act. Function d : Agt × St → P(Act) defines actions available to an agent in a state, and o is a deterministic transition function that assigns an outcome state q ′ = o(q, α 1 , . . . , α k ) to state q, and a tuple of actions α 1 , . . . , α k that can be executed by Agt in q. A strategy of agent a is a conditional plan that specifies what a is going to do for every possible situation (s a : St → Act such that s a (q) ∈ d(a, q)). 2 A collective strategy (called also a strategy profile) S A for a group of agents A is a tuple of strategies S a , one per agent a ∈ A. A path Λ in M is an infinite sequence of states that can be effected by subsequent transitions, and refers to a possible course of action (or a possible computation) that may occur in the system; by Λ[i], we denote the ith position on path Λ. Function out(q, S A ) returns the set of all paths that may result from agents A executing strategy S A from state q onward: Now, the semantics of ATL formulae can be given via the following clauses:
CTL etc.). 2 This is a deviation from the original semantics of ATL, where strategies assign agents' choices to sequences of states, which suggests that agents can recall the whole history of each game. Both types of strategies yield equivalent semantics for "vanilla" ATL [16] . However, they do not result in equivalent logics for ATL* nor for most ATL variants with incomplete information. We use "memoryless" strategies here because they pose less conceptual difficulties when defining the semantics. Moreover, model checking strategic abilities of agents with perfect recall and incomplete information is believed undecidable [2, 16] , which undermines practical importance of these logics.
The complexity of ATL model checking is linear in the number of transitions in the model and the length of the formula [2] , which suggests that practical applications may be possible.
Strategic Ability and Incomplete Information
ATL is unrealistic in a sense: real-life agents seldom possess complete information about the current state of the world. Alternating-time Temporal Epistemic Logic (ATEL) [17, 18] enriches the picture with an epistemic component, adding to ATL operators for representing agents' knowledge: K a ϕ reads as "agent a knows that ϕ". Additional operators E A ϕ, C A ϕ, and D A ϕ refer to mutual knowledge ("everybody knows"), common knowledge, and distributed knowledge among the agents from A. Models for ATEL extend concurrent game structures with epistemic accessibility relations ∼ 1 , ..., ∼ k ⊆ Q × Q (one per agent) for modeling agents' uncertainty; the relations are assumed to be equivalences. We will call such models concurrent epistemic game structures (CEGS) in the rest of the paper. Agent a's epistemic relation is meant to encode a's inability to distinguish between the (global) system states: q ∼ a q ′ means that, while the system is in state q, agent a cannot determine whether it is not in q ′ . Then:
Relations ∼ Figure 1 ; we will refer to the model as M 0 throughout the rest of the paper. Note that M 0 , q 0 |= a ♦win (and even M 0 , q 0 |= K a a ♦win), although, intuitively, a has no feasible way of ensuring a win. This is a fundamental problem with ATEL, which we discuss briefly below.
It was pointed out in several places that the meaning of ATEL formulae is somewhat counterintuitive [6, 7, 11] . Most importantly, one would expect that an agent's ability to achieve property ϕ should imply that the agent has enough control and knowledge to identify and execute a strategy that enforces ϕ (cf. also [16] ). This problem is closely related to the well known distinction between knowledge de re and knowledge de dicto [15, 12, 13] .
A number of frameworks were proposed to overcome this problem [6, 7, 16, 11, 19, 5 ], yet none of them seems the ultimate definitive solution. Most of the solutions agree that only uniform strategies (i.e., strategies that specify the same choices in indistinguishable states) are really executable. However, in order to identify a successful strategy, the agents must consider not only the courses of action, starting from the current state of the system, but also from states that are indistinguishable from the current one. There are many cases here, especially when group epistemics is concerned: the agents may have common, ordinary or distributed knowledge about a strategy being successful, or they may be hinted the right strategy by a distinguished member (the "boss"), a subgroup ("headquarters committee") or even another group of agents ("consulting company"). Most existing solutions [16, 19, 5] treat only some of the cases (albeit rather in an elegant way), while others [7, 11] offer a more general treatment of the problem at the expense of an overblown logical language (which is by no means elegant).
Recently, a new, non-standard semantics for ability under incomplete information has been proposed in [9, 10] , which we believe to be both intuitive, general and elegant. We summarize the proposal in the next section, as we will use it further to capture strategic abilities of agents.
An Intuitive Semantics for Ability and Knowledge
When analyzing consequences of their strategies, agents must consider also the outcome paths starting from states other than the current state -namely, all states that look the same as the current state. Thus, a property of a strategy being successful with respect to goal ϕ is not local to the current state; the same strategy must be successful in all "opening" states being considered. In [9, 10] , a non-standard semantics for the logic of strategic ability and incomplete information has been proposed, which we believe to be finally satisfying. In the semantics, formulae are interpreted over sets of states rather than single states. This reflects the intuition that the "constructive" ability to enforce ϕ means that the agents in question have a single strategy that brings about ϕ for all possible initial situations -and not that a successful strategy exists for each initial situation (because those could be different strategies for different situations).
Moreover, we introduce "constructive knowledge" operators K a , one for each agent a, that yield the set of states, indistinguishable from the current state from a's perspective. Constructive common, mutual, and distributed knowledge is formalized via operators C A , E A , and D A . The language, which we tentatively call Constructive Strategic Logic (CSL) here, is defined as follows:
Individual knowledge operators can be derived as:
The models are concurrent epistemic game structures again, and we consider only memoryless uniform strategies. Let img(q, R) be the image of state q with respect to relation R, i.e. the set of all states q ′ such that qRq ′ . Moreover, we use out(Q, S A ) as a shorthand for ∪ q∈Q out(q, S A ), and img(Q, R) as a shorthand for ∪ q∈Q img(q, R). The notion of a formula ϕ being satisfied by a set of states Q ⊆ St in a model M is given through the following clauses.
M, Q |= A ϕ iff there exists S A such that, for every Λ ∈ out(Q, S A ) and
We will also write M, q |= ϕ as a shorthand for M, {q} |= ϕ, and this is the notion of satisfaction (in single states) that we are ultimately interested in -but that notion is defined in terms of the satisfaction in sets of states. Now, K a a ϕ expresses the fact that a has a single strategy that enforces ϕ from all states indiscernible from the current state, instead of stating that ϕ can be achieved from every such state separately (what K a a ϕ says, which is very much in the spirit of standard epistemic logic). More generally, the first kind of formulae refer to having a strategy "de re" (i.e. having a successful strategy and knowing the strategy), while the latter refer to having a strategy "de dicto" (i.e. only knowing that some successful strategy is available; cf. [7] ). Note also that the property of having a winning strategy in the current state (but not necessarily even knowing about it) is simply expressed with a ϕ. Capturing different ability levels of coalitions is analogous, with various "epistemic modes" of collective recognizing the right strategy.
Example 2 Robot a has no winning strategy in the starting state of the game: M 0 , q 0 |= ¬ a ♦win, which implies that it has neither a strategy "de re" nor "de dicto" (M 0 , q 0 |= ¬K a a ♦win∧¬K a a ♦win). On the other hand, he has a successful strategy in q AK (just play keep) and he knows he has one (because another action, exch, is bound to win in q AQ ); still, the knowledge is not constructive, since a does not know which strategy is the right one in the current situation: M 0 , q AK |= a g win ∧ K a a g win ∧ ¬K a a g win. Also, b's playing chg enforces a transition to q w for both q AQ , q KQ , so M 0 , q AQ |= K b b g win (robot b has a strategy "de re" to enforce a win from q AQ ).
Finally, q QK |= a, b ♦win ∧ E {a,b} a, b ♦win ∧ C {a,b} a, b ♦win ∧¬E {a,b} a, b ♦win∧D {a,b} a, b ♦win: in q QK , the robots have a collective strategy to enforce a win, and they all know it (they even have common knowledge about it); on the other hand, they cannot identify the right strategy as a team -they can only see one if they share knowledge at the beginning (i.e., in q QK ).
Epistemic Temporal Strategic Logic
A very interesting variation on the theme of combining strategic, epistemic and temporal aspects of a multi-agent system was proposed in [19] . Epistemic Temporal Strategic Logic (ETSL) digs deeper in the repository of game theory, and focuses on the concept of undominated strategies. Thus, its variant of cooperation modalities has a different flavor than the ones from ATL, ATEL, CSL etc. In a way, formula A ϕ in ETSL can be summarized as:
"If A play rationally to achieve ϕ (meaning: they never play a dominated strategy), they will achieve ϕ".
ETSL can be treated as a logic that describes the outcome of rational play under incomplete information, 3 in the same way as CSL can be seen as a logic that captures agents' strategic abilities (regardless of whether the agents play rationally or not). The main claim we propose in this paper is that a rational player knows that he will succeed if, and only if, he has a strategy "de re" to succeed -while the same is not true for rational coalitions of players. However, before we present and discuss the claim formally in Section 4, we must re-write the semantics of ETSL in several respects.
First, the original semantics of ETSL is defined only for finite turn-based acyclic game models with epistemic accessibility relations, and we will generalize the semantics to concurrent epistemic game structures. Next, the semantics comes with a plethora of auxiliary functions and definitions (and a couple of omissions), which makes it rather hard to read. In fact, this is probably the reason why the logic never received the attention it deserves, and it is definitely worth trying to make the semantics more compact. Finally, the authors of [19] propose that a model should include also a "grand strategy profile" S Agt , defining the actual strategies of all agents (or at least constraining them in some way, since non-deterministic strategies are allowed in ETSL). While the idea seems interesting in itself (a similar idea was later exploited e.g. in [8] to allow for explicit analysis of strategies and reasoning about strategy revision), we will show that it does not introduce a finer-grained analysis of "vanilla" ETSL formulas: if a formula holds in M, q for one strategy profile, it holds in M, q for all the other strategy profiles, too. Moreover, it can be proved that the semantics of cooperation modalities A is the same regardless of whether we consider non-deterministic strategies or not. In conse-quence, we will be able to show a "vanilla" ETSL semantics expressed entirely in terms of concurrent epistemic game structures and their states.
The Semantics Made Easier to Read
Formulae of ETSL come with no restriction with respect to grouping of temporal operators:
After some re-writing (and having it generalized to general game structures, not only turn-based trees), the semantics can be given as follows. Strategies are allowed to be non-deterministic, i.e. S a : St → P(Act). 4 We require strategies to be uniform, although [19] does not do it explicitly (we take it as a simple omission, because otherwise many claims in that paper seem to be false). A collective strategy (strategy profile) S A is a tuple of strategies, one per agent from A. S 0 a is the "neutral strategy" with no restriction on a's actions (S 0 a (q) = Act for each q ∈ St), and strategy profile S 0 A assigns neutral strategies to agents from A. Moreover, we generalize function out(q, S A ) to handle nondeterministic strategies too; in out
. Note that, for deterministic S A , we have out ′ (q, S A ) = out(q, S A ). Now, the semantics can be given through the following clauses (the semantics for p, ¬ϕ and ϕ ∧ ψ is analogous to the one presented in Section 2.1):
M, S Agt , q |= A ϕ iff for all strategies T A , undominated wrt q, ϕ, we have 
A Few Properties
In this section, we present several properties of ETSL formulae that will allow us to give an even simpler semantic definition of "vanilla" ETSL. Cases ϕ ≡ A ψ and ϕ ≡ A ψ 1 U ψ 2 : analogous.
Proposition 2 For every "vanilla" ETSL formula
Case ϕ ≡ K a ψ: M, S Agt , q |= K a ψ, so M, (S Agt (a), S 0 Agt\{a} ), q ′ |= ψ for all q ∼ a q ′ . By induction hypothesis, also M, (S ′ Agt (a), S 0 Agt\{a} ), q ′ |= ψ for all q ∼ a q ′ , so M, S ′ Agt , q |= K a ψ.
Remark 3
We point out that restricting the scope of Proposition 2 to "vanilla" ETSL formulae is important. In particular, the epistemic opertor K a has a non-standard interpretation when the full language of ETSL is considered.
Proposition 4
Let Φ ≡ g ψ, ψ, or ψ 1 U ψ 2 where ψ, ψ 1 , ψ 2 are "vanilla" ETSL formulae. Moreover, let |Φ| denote the set of paths for which Φ holds; formally,
Then, S A dominates T A wrt Φ, M , and q iff:
Proof. Straightforward from the definition.
Remark 5 Note that dominance can be characterized in an even more compact way. Let succ q,Φ (S
Proof. ⇒: Let T A be dominated by S A (wrt ϕ, M, q). We construct the deterministic strategy S ′ A by fixing arbitrary (uniform) choices out of S A . Formally, for every agent a ∈ A and abstraction class img(q 
ETSL in Terms of Concurrent Epistemic Game Structures
We have shown that, for "vanilla" ETSL, strategies do not have to be referred explicitly in the interpretation of formulae (Propositions 2 and 4) . Moreover, we can restrict the set of considered strategies to deterministic strategies (Propositions 6 and 7). In consequence, we can express the semantics of "vanilla" ETSL equivalently in ATL-like fashion:
M, q |= A g ϕ iff for every strategy S A , undominated wrt q, g ϕ, and every Λ ∈ out(q, S A ), we have that M, Λ[1] |= ϕ;
M, q |= A ϕ iff for every strategy S A , undominated wrt q, ϕ, and every Λ ∈ out(q, S A ) and i ≥ 0 we have M,
M, q |= A ϕ U ψ iff for every strategy S A , undominated wrt q, ϕ U ψ, and every
Only uniform deterministic strategies are taken into account. The semantics of p, ¬ϕ, ϕ ∧ ψ, and the epistemic operators is the same as for ATL and ATEL.
Playing Rationally vs. Knowing how to Play
We can finally present the main result of this paper, namely, that a rational player knows that he will succeed if, and only if, he has a strategy "de re" to succeed. The result holds under the assumption that the model is finite, 5 or more generally, that it includes at least one undominated strategy.
Moreover, we show that having common knowledge how to succeed is, in general, a stronger property than knowing that one will succeed for rational coalitions of players. That is, if rational agents have common knowledge about a winning strategy, then they have common knowledge that they will succeed -but the converse is not true any more. Surprisingly enough, it turns out that the relationship is strictly reverse for distributed knowledge: if a rational coalition has distributed knowledge that it will succeed, then it has distributed knowledge about a winning strategy -but not necessarily the other way around. For mutual knowledge, the relationship holds neither way.
In what follows, we use |= ETSL and |= CSL to denote the ETSL and CSL satisfaction relation, respectively.
Rational Play of Individual Agents
We begin with two important lemmas. 5 We use the term "finite model" to denote a CEGS with a finite set of states St. M , state q in M , formula Φ and agent a, there is a  strategy s a which is undominated wrt M, q, Φ. Proof. First, we consider the simpler case when the set of actions Act is finite. In such a case, the set of strategies is also finite, and the dominance relation is transitive and antireflexive. Suppose that every strategy is dominated; then, there must be a strategy which is dominated by itself -a contradiction.
Lemma 8 Given a finite model
We sketch the proof for infinite Act as follows. We partition the infinite set of strategies into equivalence classes, such that strategies in the same class have the same outcome paths for every state q (i.e., s a ≈ t a iff ∀ q out(q, s a ) = out(q, t a )). Obviously, if s a dominates t a , then all strategies s ′ a ≈ s a dominate t a too. Now, at every state q (and therefore at every point on a path from out(q ′ , s a )) there is a finite number of possible sets of successor states (the actual set being determined by the choice s a (q)). Moreover, the same choice (and hence a set of successors) must be taken at every further occurrence of the same state q on a path, since s a is a memoryless strategy. In consequence, there is only a finite number of different sets of outcome paths, and hence a finite number of the equivalence classes. Again, dominance is transitive and antireflexive, so an undominated strategy must exist. To prove this, suppose that a strategy s a is undominated. The strategy is uniform, so s a (q) = α for some α ∈ R + and all q ∈ (0, 1). Obviously, α ∈ (0, 1), because else s a never succeeds. Now, the set of states in which s a is successful is: succ 0.5, g win (s a ) = (0, 1 − α). Let t a (q) = q + α/2. Now, succ 0.5, g win (t a ) = (0, 1 − α/2) succ 0.5,Φ (s a ) -a contradiction. Note also that:
Remark 9 Note that the result in Lemma 8 does not extend to
• If we replace R + with the set of positive rational numbers, the result is the same.
So, there may be no undominated strategies even when we restrict St and Act to countable sets.
• In order to show the same for countable St and finite Act, it is sufficient to modify the example so that Act = {0, 1, call}, and the initial state and every subsequent action α = 0, 1 are simply stored in the resulting state. Now o(q, call) takes the initial state q 0 and the string of 0s and 1s α 1 , ..., α n stored in q, and returns q ′ = q 0 + (0.α 1 ...α n 1) 2 . For such a game, there is no undominated strategy wrt 0.5, ♦win.
Lemma 10
Given M, q, Φ, a, if there is an undominated strategy wrt M, q, Φ, then there is also an undominated strategy wrt M, q ′ , Φ for every q ′ ∈ img(q, ∼ a ).
Proof. Take any s a undominated wrt M, q, Φ (*). Suppose now that s a is dominated by some strategy t a wrt another state q ′ ∈ img(q, ∼ a ) (**).
1. By (*) and Prop. 4:
2. By (**) and Prop. 4:
Moreover, img(q, ∼ a ) = img(q ′ , ∼ a ) because is ∼ a is an equivalence relation -which gives a contradiction between (1) and (2).
Remark 11
We note that Lemma 10 may hold even for indistinguishability relations that are not equivalences. In fact, it is sufficient to require that ∼ a is transitive. In that case, q ′ ∈ img(q, ∼ a ) and q ′′ ∈ img(q ′ , ∼ a ) implies that q ′′ ∈ img(q, ∼ a ), and we also get the contradiction.
We are ready to prove the main claim of this paper now.
Theorem 12
Let us consider only finite models, and formulae Φ ≡ g ψ, ψ, or ψ 1 U ψ 2 where ψ, ψ 1 , ψ 2 are "vanilla" ETSL formulae. An agent has a strategy "de re" to enforce Φ if, and only if, he knows that his rational play will bring about Φ. Formally, for every finite M and state q in M :
Proof. Induction on the structure of Φ. We prove the theorem for the case Φ ≡ ψ. Other cases are analogous.
′ |= ETSL a ψ, and hence M, q |= ETSL a ψ in particular. By Lemmas 8 and 10, there is a strategy s a , undominated wrt M, q ′ , ψ for every q ′ ∈ img(q, ∼ a ).
|= CSL ψ and so M, img(q, ∼ a ) |= CSL a ψ, and finally M, q |= CSL K a a ψ.
, and therefore succ q ′ , ψ (t a ) = img(q ′ , ∼ a ) for every other undominated strategy t a (otherwise t a would be dominated by s a ). Thus, M, q ′ |= ETSL a ψ for every q ′ ∈ img(q, ∼ a ), and finally M, q |= ETSL K a a ψ.
Theorem 13
More generally, for every Φ as above, and M, q such that there exists an undominated strategy wrt M, q, Φ:
It is easy to see that Theorem 13 implies Theorem 12.
Rational Coalitions Are at Disadvantage
Beside some philosophical insight into the nature of knowledge and rational play, Theorems 12 and 13 provide us with an alternative way of decomposing strategic abilities under incomplete information into a strategic and epistemic part. The definition of the strategic dimension is more sophisticated and less straightforward than usually; on the other hand, we do not pay the price of a non-standard satisfaction relation. Unfortunately, such decomposition is not valid any more when abilities of collective agents are concerned. Now, the relationship is much more limited: if a coalition has common knowledge how to play, then it has also common knowledge that rational play will be successful; the same does not hold for other types of collective knowledge. Moreover, the converse relationship is guaranteed for distributed knowledge, but not for common nor mutual knowledge.
Theorem 14
Let Φ ≡ g ψ, ψ, or ψ 1 U ψ 2 where ψ, ψ 1 , ψ 2 are "vanilla" ETSL formulae. Then, if a coalition has common knowledge how to play, then it has common knowledge that rational play will be successful:
The same holds for neither mutual nor distributed knowledge.
for every other undominated strategy T A (otherwise T A would be dominated by S A ). Thus, M, q ′ |= ETSL A ψ for every q ′ ∈ img(q, ∼ C A ), and finally M, q |= ETSL C A A ψ. Mutual knowledge: for a counterexample, consider a modification of the game from Figure 1 , in which a third robot c is introduced. The robot can only execute nop, and its epistemic relation ∼ c = {(q, q) | q ∈ St} ∪ {(q KQ , q KA ), (q KA , q KQ )}, i.e. c can distinguish all states except q KQ , q KA . Moreover, the transition function is slightly changed: now, o(q KA , keep, nop) = q w . For the resulting system M 1 , we have that M 1 , q AQ |= CSL E {b,c} b, c g win, but at the same time M 1 , q AQ |= ETSL E {a,c} a, c g win because M 1 , q KQ |= ETSL a, c g win. 
Theorem 15
Let Φ ≡ g ψ, ψ, or ψ 1 U ψ 2 where ψ, ψ 1 , ψ 2 are "vanilla" ETSL formulae, and let M be a finite CEGS. 6 Then, if A have distributed knowledge that rational play will bring about Φ, then they have distributed knowledge how to play to bring about Φ. Agt are exactly the strategies undominated wrt q 0 , g win. So, M 2 , q i |= ETSL Agt g win for every i = 0, 1, ..., 4, and therefore M 2 , q 0 |= ETSL E Agt Agt g win. On the other hand, there is no single strategy that succeeds for all q 0 , q 1 , ..., q 4 .
Common knowledge: consider model M 3 from Figure 2B . Let S {a,b} be the strategy "play 1, 1 everywhere", and T {a,b} be "play 2, 2 everywhere". Note that S {a,b} is the only undominated strategy wrt q, g win for q = q 0 , q 1 , and T {a,b} is the only
Conclusions
In this paper, the relationship between rational play and knowing how to play is investigated in a formal way. To this end, we dust off Epistemic Temporal Strategic Logic by van Otterloo and Jonker [19] , and propose a simpler semantics expressed entirely in terms of concurrent epistemic game structures and their states; we prove that the new semantics is equivalent to the original one for "vanilla" ETSL formulae. ETSL serves as a device for talking about the outcome of rational play (in the sense that agents are assumed to play only undominated strategies). To capture properties of the other kind ("knowing how to play"), we use the recent proposal of Constructive Strategic Logic [9, 10] .
The main result of this paper states that, for finite models, a rational player knows that he will succeed if, and only if, he knows how to succeed. We also show that the relationship is much more limited for rational coalitions. That is, if rational agents have common knowledge about a winning strategy, then they have common knowledge that they will succeed -but the converse is not guaranteed any more. Moreover, it turns out that the relationship is strictly reverse for distributed knowledge: if a rational coalition has distributed knowledge that it will succeed, then it has distributed knowledge about a winning strategy -but not necessarily the other way around. Finally, for mutual knowledge, the relationship does not hold either way in general. This is a curious result, and one that may lead to interesting philosophical conclusions.
